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INF TREATY ON-SITE VERIFICATION: AN EMERGING
STANDARD FOR POLICING ARMS CONTROL
TREATY OBLIGATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last few years, a highlight of American/Soviet relations has
been the efforts of the superpowers to negotiate and ratify various arms
control agreements. On June 1, 1988, United States President Reagan
and Soviet leader Gorbachev exchanged ratification documents' for the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and
Shorter-Range Missiles 2 (the "INF Treaty"). The treaty entered into
force and called for the elimination of nuclear weapons for the first time.
The INF Treaty is the first major arms control agreement to come into
effect since 1972, when the limitations of the Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty3 (the "ABM Treaty") and the SALT I Treaty4 took effect.
The most striking feature of the INF Treaty is its provision for OnSite Verification ("OSI") of the parties' mutual treaty obligations. For
the first time, delegates of both the United States and the Soviet Union
will travel to each other's territory to conduct visual inspections of
intermediate-range ballistic missiles ("IRBM"s) and shorter-range ballistic
missiles ("SRBM"s) in compliance with the treaty's provisions. The goal
of this Note is to examine the precedential value of the OSI verification
provisions of the INF Treaty in the context of prior arms control
1. See Moscow Summit Brings Little Progress on Arms Control, ARMS CONTROL TODAY,
July-Aug. 1988, at 19.
2. Dec. 8, 1987, United States-Soviet Union, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 84 (1988) and in
BuFa-Au OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 9555, Dec. 1987 [hereinafter
PUB. No. 9555].
3. May 26, 1972, United States-Soviet Union, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503. The
ABM Treaty prohibited (with the exception of two areas of very limited size), the
deployment of anti-ballistic missiles in the home territories of both the United States and
the Soviet Union. The treaty also prohibited testing of such weapons, with the exception
of "futuristic systems," the-interpretation of which has been controversial, not only between
the United States and the Soviet Union, but also between Congress and the Reagan administration. See Biden & Ritch, The End of the Sofaer Doctrine:A Victory for Arms Control
and the Constitution, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Sept. 1988, at 3-8.
4. May 26, 1972, United States-Soviet Union, 23 U.S.T. 3463, T.I.A-S. No. 7504. The
acronym "SALT" originated from the label given to the negotiations which led to the treaty:
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. In general, the SALT I Treaty prohibited the construction
of additional land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles ("ICBM") "launchers" (e.g., silos)
and limited the numbers of submarine-launched ballistic missiles ("SLBM"s) and submarines
capable of carrying SLBMs.
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5
agreements - most notably ABM, SALT I, and the SALT II Treaty - and
a future American/Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ("START"),
currently being negotiated between the United States and the Soviet
6
Union.

II.

VERIFICATION AND ITS ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL TREATIES

Treaty verification provides the apparatus for a treaty party to decide
whether the actions of another party, or parties to a treaty, fall within
the terms of the agreement, "based on the text of the treaty, relevant
records, diplomatic changes and applicable law." 7 Verification has been
defined in several ways: as "a dynamic process for determining whether
or not commitments assumed under an international agreement are being
fulfilled;" 8 as "the process of determining the degree to which parties to
an agreement are complying with the provisions of an agreement;" 9 and
as "the process of obtaining assurance about specific, limited, and definite
provisions of a contract."' 0
5. June 18, 1979, United States-Soviet Union, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1112 (1979) and in
S. TALBOTT, ENDGAME: THE INSIDE STORY OF SALT 11279-88 (1979). The SALT II Treaty
was never ratified. After the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979,
President Carter asked the Senate to postpone its consideration of the treaty. At that time,
Senate ratification of the SALT II Treaty was "all but impossible." ARMS CONTROL ASS'N
& THE PLOUGHSHARES FUND, COUNTDOWN ON SALT 11 19 (1985). President Carter, and
later President Reagan, however, pledged to follow SALT II's provisions, as long as the
Soviet Union did the same. Id.
6. See infra notes 158-188 and accompanying text.
7. SEN. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, THE INF TREATY MONITORING AND VERIFICATION
CAPABILrrIES, S. REP. No. 318, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., 5 (1988) [hereinafter SEN.
INTELLIGENCE REP.]. It is critical to understand that arms control verification is inextricably
linked with considerations of policy, politics, and technology. While a comprehensive
discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this effort, such issues affect negotiations
concerning arms control verification, and bear directly on the precedential nature of the
INF Treaty. "[Vierification cannot be viewed in a vacuum." Id. at 3-4.
8. Matte, International Verification Procedures:Past and Future Prospects, in 11 ANNALS
OF AIR & SPACE L. 237, 238 n.2 (1986) (quoting DEP'T FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS FOR THE
U.N. SECRETARY GEN., REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS 26, para. 134, U.N. Study Series
10 (1986)).
9. Matte, supra note 7, at 238 n.2 (citing ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGENCY, PUB.
No. 74, SALT LEXICON (1974)).
10. Katz, The Fabricof Verification: The Warp and the Woof, in VERIFICATION AND SALT:
THE CHALLENGE OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION 193 (W. Potter ed. 1980) [hereinafter VERIFICATION AND SALT]; see also M. SHEEHAN, ARMS CONTROL THEORY AND PRACTICE 123 (1988)
("IThe process by which states utilize their intelligence gathering and interpretation
capabilities for the purpose of satisfying themselves that their treaty partners are abiding by
the terms of the agreements they have signed."); R. SCRIBNER, T. RALSTON & W. METz, THE
VERIFICATION CHALLENGE: PROBLEMS AND PROMISE OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

24 (1985) [hereinafter R. SCRIBNER.1 ("[Tjhe process and means by which the
parties to an agreement are able to ascertain with confidence that the other party or parties
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Verification has three purposes: 1) to detect variations from agreed
arms limitations or reductions; 2) to deter treaty violations and ensure
compliance; and 3) to promote public confidence in arms control agreements.1 In turn, these objectives rest on three assumptions: 1) that a
treaty partner will try to cheat; 2) that the risk of such cheating may be
minimized by scrutinizing an adversary's actions; and 3) that a nation's2
own population assumes that an adversary will try to cheat on a treaty.'
Public confidence in any arms control agreement is critical. Any
doubts regarding a treaty's verification, justified or not, may undermine
public support necessary for any treaty. 3 Thus, verification has been
called a "substitute for trust."' 4
The two major concepts involved in verification are monitoring and
evaluation. 5 Monitoring is "the collection of information pertinent to
the treaty partners' behavior regarding the agreement in question,"' 6 and
may be a "straightforward technical exercise. . ".."' Monitoring is not
the most important aspect of verification." The key to verification lies
in the "[c]omplex, subjective judgments" 19 involved in the interpretation
and the evaluation of data collected through monitoring, where "data is
analyzed and interpreted in order to determine whether the treaty is in
fact being complied with."' For example, in 1973, United States Minuteman ICBM silos were modernized. During the work on the silos, large
prefabricated shelters were used to protect workers from the weather.
These environmental shelters also covered the silos, preventing Soviet spy
satellites from "seeing" the silos. Whether this action constituted a
violation of article V of the SALT I Treaty, which prohibits either nation
from inhibiting the other's ability to monitor treaty compliance, depends
21
upon the interpretation of the data, not the data itself.
are abiding by the terms of the agreement."); Harris, A SALT Safeguards Program: Coping
with Soviet Deception Under Strategic Arms Agreements, in VERIFICATION AND SALT, supra,
at 129 ("[T]he process of identifying compliance or noncompliance with an expected event,
[such as] the SALT II Treaty.").
11. M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 124.
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id at 125. Sheehan suggests that it was "inevitable" that the East-West arms control
agreements focused on verification issues because the cold war relationship between the
superpowers was "marked by a profound absence of trust." Id at 121.
15. Id at 123.
16. Id
17. Id.
18. Id
19.

W. ROWELL, ARMs CONTROL VERIFICATION: A GUIDE TO POLICY IssuEs FOR THE 1980s,

at 77 (1986).
20. M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 123.
21. Vance, Carter Administration Report on Compliance with SALT I, in SALT
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EVALUATING VERIFICATION: How MUCH IS ENOUGH?

There are three arms control verification standards: adequate,
effective, and absolute."
Each standard is a function of different
acceptable maximum levels of uncertainty regarding another treaty party's
compliance with the agreement2 a
A. Adequate Verification
Adequate verification exists when the United States has the ability
to detect and respond to Soviet treaty violations before they pose a
significant military risk or before they affect the American/Soviet strategic
balance. 24 Implicit in the adequate verification standard is the notion that
"high confidence verification" 21 is not needed in all parts of an arms
control treaty, and that the important consideration in assessing
verification is the total agreement, not just isolated provisions.26 Absolute
certainty of another's treaty compliance is considered impossible, and
insistence upon such a high standard of verification would result in a
stalemate in arms control talks because the monitoring requirement would
be too great.Y Therefore, adequate verification is a practical standard
rather than an abstract ideal. 28 Confidence in the adequate verification
standard rests .in the notion that any cheating that might be hidden
successfully would be so small as to be insignificant militarily and any
significant effort to cheat might be detected. 29
Adequate verification has played a "very prominent role" in nuclear
HANDBOOK: KEY DOCUMENTS AND IssuEs, 1972-1979, at 529, 533 (R. Labrie ed. 1979).

The
Soviet Union accused the United States of interfering with Soviet monitoring capabilities.
Because the shelters were used for environmental purposes only, and not for deliberate
concealment, the United States believed it complied with article V. lit The United States,
however, reduced the size of the shelters, based on the mutual understanding that each side
should not interfere with the other's national technical means of verifying compliance with
SALT I. Id.
22. W. ROWELL, supra note 19, at 78; see also R. SCRIBNER, supra note 10, at 15-16.
23. W. ROWELL, supra note 19, at 78.
24. Id at 83-84 (quoting W. PANOFSKY, ARMS CONTROL AND SALT II, at 44 (1979)).
25. Id. at 84.
26. The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Protocol Thereto, Together
Referred to as the SALT H Treaty, both signed at i'enna, Austria, on June 18, 1979, and
Related Documents: HearingsBefore the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 248 (1979) [hereinafter SALT H Hearings].
27. Id
28. M. SHEEIAN, supra note 10, at 128.
29. Id at 129.
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arms control history.3° In 1969, President Nixon instructed the American
SALT I delegation to adopt the adequate verification standard. 31 In 1973,
adequate verification was recognized in the Agreement on United StatesSoviet Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitations of
Strategic Offensive Arms.3 2 In 1974, President Ford instructed the United
States SALT II delegation to maintain the adequate verification standard. 33 Three years later, the 1977 Amendment to the Arms Control and4
Disarmament Act formally enshrined the adequate verification standard.
Finally, in 1979, President Carter defended the SALT II Treaty on the
grounds that it provided adequate verification.35
Critics of adequate verification, on the other hand, argue that it is
too loose a standard and that a more demanding threshold "amounting
to a requirement for absolute certainty [regarding another party's treaty
compliance]" is needed.36 Specifically, adequate verification critics reject
reliance upon subjective judgments about the military significance of
potential violations and how such violations might affect the American/
Soviet strategic balance. 37 In addition, adequate verification overlooks
confidence-building measures (such as OSI) that increase the political
stock of control agreements. 38
B. Effective and Absolute Verification

Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, is an advocate of effective verification and an
outspoken critic of adequate verification. He defined effective verification as "any behavior inconsistent with [a] treaty [that] could be detected
by the other party."3 9 This standard was believed to be a "notch higher

than 'adequate verification.' 40 The 1984 Report of the President's

30. W. ROWELL, supra note 19, at 82.
31. SALT H Hearings, supra note 26, at 288 (statement of George M. Seignious 11,
Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency).
32. ld
33. Id
34. Id
Effective verification was rejected as having been impossible to meet. W.
ROWELL, supra note 19, at 83 (quoting Clarke & Gromoll, Who Trusts the Russians?: The
PoliticalIssue of Arms Control Verification, FOREIGN SERVICE, June 1979).
35. State of the Union Address by President Carter (Jan. 23, 1979), reprinted in N.Y.
Times, Jan. 24, 1979, at A13, col. 4.
36. M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 129.
37. W. ROWELL, supra note 19, at 84-85.
38. Id at 85.
39. M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 129 (emphasis in original).
40. W. ROWELL, supra note 19, at 86 (quoting Ambassador Edward L. Rowney's remarks
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Commission of Strategic Forces (the "Scowcroft Commission") defined
effective verification in more lenient terms-the ability to "detect with
a high degree of confidence any set of violations which would have a
significant impact on the strategic balance. '41 Proponents of the effective
verification standard believe that the Soviet Union has the ability to
change the American/Soviet strategic balance with a small number of
weapons, creating a strong incentive for the West to secure compliance
with disarmament proposals.4 2
The Reagan administration asserted that adequate verification was
insufficient and that verification must be effective. 3 Effective verification
was incorporated subsequently into the Reagan administration arms
control policy. Under this policy, arms control treaties that were not
100% verifiable were viewed as posing a potential threat to American
security, inconsistent with the national interest." Critics of effective
verification argue that the technical and legal perspectives embraced by
the standard detract from the more important questions involving the
"strategic/military" and political significance of Soviet behavior.45
Effective verification does not avoid the use of subjective evaluation of
monitoring data, as its advocates claim.4
Absolute verification is possible only when "little if any uncertainty
about the ability to verify compliance" exists. 47 This standard is endorsed
by those who believe that arms control agreements which are not
completely verifiable threaten American security.48 Basically, both absolute and effective verification embrace the same concept - the need
for ultimate certainty regarding an adversary's treaty compliance.
Common sense indicates that such a goal is difficult and unnecessary.

following his speech on "Strategic Arms Control and United States-Soviet Relations" to the
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Cambridge, Mass., Mar. 1, 1984).
41. Final Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, Mar. 21, 1984, at
7. In its report, the Scowcroft Commission identified the elements essential to "reduc[ing]
the chances of nuclear conflict." Id at 9.
42. W. ROWELL, supra note 19, at 3.
43. Matte, supra note 8, at 248.
44. Id

45. W. RowEL, supra note 19, at 121.
46. Id at 87.
47. Id at 79.
48. Id. Senator Jesse Helms, a proponent of the absolute verification standard,
attempted to discredit a less strict verification standard (i.e. adequate verification), which
had been advocated by United States Secretary of Defense Harold Brown during the SALT
11hearings. SALT 11 Hearings, supra note 26, at 261.
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C. Verification and Treaty Enforcement
Finally, it is important to understand that verification is related to,
but different from, treaty enforcement. Enforcement relates to actions
taken by a treaty party once it has determined that another treaty party
has violated its respective treaty obligations. In contrast, verification is
procedural in nature; it focuses on agreed measures allowing each party

to determine whether the other party is complying with its treaty obligations. Thus, treaty verification is of critical importance in insuring that
a nation meets its legal obligations. For example, Ralph Earle II, a
member of the American delegation to the SALT II negotiations, stated
that the substantive portions of the SALT II Treaty and related protocols
only amounted to 5 to 15% of the treaty documents, whereas verification
comprised 85 to 95% of the treaty documents.49
III. EARLY ARMS CONTROL TREATIES: ABM, SALT I, SALT II
AND NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

A. Early Arms Control Verification: The Road to SALT I

In a sense, the INF Treaty represents the end of a cycle in arms
control verification. The 1946 Baruch Plan"° (named after Bernard
Baruch, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations who
presented the plan to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission)
marked the first major effort to control nuclear weapons. Motivated by
the concern that other nations could develop atomic weaponry,51 this
American proposal52 called for the creation of an International Atomic
49. Earle, Verification Issues from the Point of View of the Negotiator, in ARMS CONTROL
VERIFICATION: THE TECHNOLOGIES THAT MAKE IT POSSIBLE 14 (K. Tsipis, D. Hafemeister &
P. Janeway eds. 1986) [hereinafter ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION]. Earle came to this
conclusion during his testimony regarding SALT II before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, when he promised to delete non-verification related text from the treaty,
assuming the treaty had been concluded with a nation that the United States trusted fully.
Id
50. Matte, supra note 8, at 238. Baruch, who was a Wall Street financier and presidential advisor, presented the proposal to the United Nations. It was hoped that Baruch's
prestige would enhance the plan's political acceptability. J. GRANT, BERNARD M. BARUCH:
THE ADVENTURES OF A WALL STREET LEGEND 306-07 (1983).
51. B. BERKownz, CALCULATED RISKS 18 (1987).
52. The plan was based on a report prepared by Under Secretary of State Dean
Acheson and David E. Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority, at the
request of Secretary of State James Byrnes, as a "broad outline" of American atomic policy.
J. GRANT, supra note 50, at 305; see also J. GADDIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE COLD WAR, 1941-1947, at 332 (1972).

N.Y.L.

SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. LV

[Vol. 10

Development Authority (the "IADA"). This proposal fell under the United Nations authority 3 and would have given the LADA the power to
inspect and control all atomic activities anywhere in the world. 4 Most
importantly, the plan would have authorized the [ADA to conduct
inspections to prevent cheating."5 Under the Baruch Plan, all United
Nations member nations, most notably the Soviet Union, would have
been subject to OSI by a United Nations agency. While the United
Nations Atomic Energy Commission adopted the Baruch Plan, it was
vetoed in the Security Council by the Soviet Union on December 31,
1946.6 The Soviets publicly rejected the plan17 because they feared that
IADA inspectors would be American spies.'$ The "war-weary" Soviet
53. J. GADDIS,supra note 52, at 332; J. GRANT, supra note 50, at 305; M. SHEEHAN, supra
note 10, at 3; Graybeal & Krepon, The Linitatons of On-Site Inspection, BULL. OF ATOM.
SCENT.,

Dec. 1987, at 23.

54. Matte, supra note 7 at 238; 3. GADDIS, supra note 52, at 332; 3. GRANT, supra note
50, at 305; M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 3. The proposed International Atomic Development Authority ("IADA") was to assume control over all concentrated uranium and thorium
deposits to ensure that such resources were available only for peaceful purposes (i.e., not
for nuclear weapons), J.GADDLS, supra, at 332, and that all uranium processing plants and
manufacturing laboratories would be dispersed so that no nation would have a strategic
monopoly. J.GRANT, supra, at 305.
55. Graybeal & Krepon, supra note 53, at 23.
56. J. GADDIS, supra note 52, at 334. It is important to note that two other aspects of
the Baruch Plan were critical to its defeat by Soviet veto in the United Nations Security
Council. First, the plan proposed that no nation on the Security Council could use their
veto when matters of atomic energy were pending. Id at 333-34; J.GRANT,supra note 50,
at 315. The Soviets were suspicious of the likely Western majority in the IADA that might
have prevented the Soviet Union from building atomic weapons while the United States
already had nuclear weapons. M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 3. This provision differed
from the initial Acheson-Lilienthal report, which stated that any "non-use" veto provision
in the Baruch Plan would reduce the chances of Soviet acceptance. Acheson believed that
any veto would constitute an admission of secret atomic weapon construction, making the
"non-use" provision unnecessary. J. GADDIS, supra, at 334; A MYRDAL, THE GAME OF
DLAR.sAMENT 76 (1976). Second, the plan proposed that nations violating the plan would
be subject to "punishment." The only nation likely to be a candidate for receiving such
treatment was the Soviet Union; the only nation likely to hand out punishment was the
United States. Id at 74-75. In short, by rejecting the Baruch Plan "[t]he Soviets declined
to relinquish any of the prerogatives of sovereignty" over their military activities. J.GRANT,
supra note 50, at 314.
57. J.GADDIS, supra note 52, at 334. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, in October 1946,
stated that Baruch was "personally the leader of U.S. imperialism." J.GRANT, supra note
50, at 315. Ironically, in March 1947 a woman walked into the New York FBI office and
accused Baruch of being the Soviet Union's "main agent" and claimed that he already had
given the A-bomb secret to them. Id.
58. W. Row.LL, supra note 19, at 151; R. SCRIBNER, supra note 10, at 28. In return, the
Soviet Union proposed that all atomic weapons be destroyed. J.GADDiS, supra note 52, at
334; A. MvRDAL,supra note 56, at 75. Furthermore, the Soviet delegate to the United
Nations Security Council, Andrei Gromyko, insisted that under the IADA "total sharing"
of all (military) atomic information would be allowed. Id The United States, while willing

INF TREA7Y ON-SITE VERIFICATION

19891

Union, led by a "paranoiacally suspicious Stalin," was not ready to accept
American insistence upon the Baruch Plan's provision for on-site
inspections. 59
Another major nuclear arms control initiative came nine years after
the Baruch Plan. President Eisenhower met with Soviet General
Secretary Nikita Khrushchev at the July 1955, summit in Geneva and
proposed the "open skies" policy6 The open skies policy would have
required both the United States and the Soviet Union to consent to
aircraft flights over each other's country, providing each nation with more
complete data on the other's military posture. 61 The Soviets refused
Eisenhower's offer of mutual cooperation on the basis that such actions
constituted espionage.62 Nevertheless, the United States developed the
U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and conducted regular flights over the Soviet
Union, collecting intelligence on Soviet military power. 63 The open skies
policy resembled an OSI-type verification plan because both the United
States and the Soviet Union would have been required to allow foreign
representatives (pilots) to enter sovereign airspace (albeit, by film) to
verify visually, the other nation's defense posture. The effectiveness of
this type of policy depends on each nation's technology, such as aircrafts,
radar, satellites, and listening posts that could accurately monitor military
installations. 6"
In August 1964, the United States proposed a freeze initiative which
would have frozen the number and characteristics of American and Soviet
strategic nuclear weapons and would have banned novel weapons
systems.6 Because the plan was founded predictably on OSI, possibly
requiring resident inspectors to be stationed at weapon production
to submit to international control over atomic weapons, was not willing to relinquish its
atomic monopoly. Id The United States responded to the Soviet initiative by detonating
its first post-World War II atomic test on July 1, 1946. Id
59. A. MYRDAL, supra note 56, at 76; see also B. BERKowrI, supra note 51, at 18.
Charles W. Thayer, a Foreign Service officer with experience in dealing with the Soviets,
stated that the Soviets were incapable of trusting American officials: "[Tihe Russians will
not trust any foreigner unless he is in jail, dead, or a member of the Communist party."
J. GRANT, supra note 50, at 314.
60. A- MvRDAL, supra note 56, at 82; M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 5.
61. Rostow, Introductory Remarks, in INTELLIGENCE AND ARMS CONTROL: A MARRIAGE
OF CONVENIENCE 1-2 (T. Hirschfeld ed. 1987) [hereinafter INTELLIGENCE AND ARMS
CONTROL].

62. W. ROWELL, supra note 19, at 3; M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 139; Rostow, supra
note 60, at 1-2. Eisenhower responded to &.hrushchev's charge that mutual aerial photography constituted espionage by stating, "Sure it's espionage. But unless we understand what
each of us has, we cannot have arms control." Id
63. See A. MYRDAL, supra note 56, at 82.
64. R. SCRIBNER, supra note 10, at 7-8.

65. J.

NEWHOUSE, COLD DAWN:

THE

STORY OF

SALT 69-70 (1973).
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installations, the Soviets rejected this proposal as well."
Development of high-technology satellites and seismic sensors during
the mid-1960s and 1970s led to National Technical Means ("NTM") arms
control verification. 67 NTM has been defined as "any nationally owned
system for monitoring compliance with arms control agreements which
operates remotely from the activities being monitored," and "encompass[ing] [an] array of sensors ... that remotely collect data on [another
party's treaty] compliance." 69 Examples of NTM technology are satellites
and aircraft equipped for visual photography, infrared (heat) detection,
radiation detection, communication interception, ground-based electronic
listening posts, seismic monitoring stations, radar, and airborne and
shipborne electronic detection systems. 70 Because NTM verification does
of
not involve the invasion of another nation's territory, no compromise
71
the national sovereignty of any treaty signatory would be involved.
In 1965, to avoid the "barrier reef' of OSI, American in-house arms
control experts began to focus their efforts on those weapons systems
that could be counted by satellites and were therefore verifiable by
NTM. 72 While early arms control verification efforts centered around
OSI-related schemes, OSI itself appeared to be an obstacle to the
conclusion of a major arms control agreement. Technological advances
leading up to SALT I, however, gave the negotiators a way out of the
inflexibility of OSI.
B. SALT : Departure From OSI and Acceptance of NTM

The Soviets "ruled out categorically" any OSI verification plan during
the first round of SALT negotiations.Y The Soviet aversion to OSI is
66. Id
67. Matte, supra note 8, at 240.
68. Id at 240-41.
69. W. RowiLL, supra note 19, at 4.
70. R. SCRIBNER, supra note 10, at 8; M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 133. The satellites
are used to relay photos back to earth, detect missile launches through infrared technology,
search and find location of ballistic missiles, and intercept electronic transmissions from
missile test flights (telemetry). R. SCRIBNER, supra, at 10. Seismic stations can detect and
measure Soviet nuclear test explosions. Id
71. Matte, supra note 8, at 241.
72. J. NEwHousE, supra note 65, at 70. For example, large weapons systems, such as
ICBMs and ABMs and their installations, are detectable by satellite photography. Id.
73. Id at 179. In 1970, prior to the first round of the SALT I negotiations in Helsinki,
Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin informed the American
delegation that OSI had "not [been] categorically ruled out."

At the first round of the

SALT I negotiations, chief Soviet delegate, Vladimir Semonov, rejected OSI verification.
Id at 179-80.
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genuine. 74 Besides the Soviet passion for secrecy, 75 Soviet rejection of
OSI is based squarely on the practical matter that the Soviets would
derive little benefit from such a proposal. 76
The final verification provisions for the ABM and SALT I treaties
are substantially identical and memorialize NTM as the agreed method
for treaty verification:
1. [E]ach Party shall use national technical means of verification at
its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized
principals of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in
accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures
which impede verification by national technical means of
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty .... 77
The "recognized principals of international law" within which each
party must conduct its NTM efforts are not mentioned in the ABM or
SALT I agreements, or their accompanying protocols. The apparent standard of international law' applying to NTM may be found in the superpowers' reaction to past arms control verification proposals: a nation
may engage in surveillance of another nation's military posture, as long
79
as the surveillance does not infringe upon any nation's sovereignty.
74. Id. at 14; see W. ROWELL, supra note 19, at 151. Soviet reluctance regarding OSI
is related to a "deep-seated" protectiveness of their homeland, and an extreme sensitivity
about their privacy. R. SCRIBNER, supra note 10, at 31.
75. J. NEWHOUSE, supra note 65, at 14; see M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 137. The
Soviet Union only agrees to verify that which is "clearly essential" to get the treaty it
prefers. Id. at 137. Any attempt to gather data on Soviet forces that is not "directly
relevant" to an arms control treaty is "espionage, pure and simple." ld.
76. 3. NEWHOUSE, supra note 65, at 14. The Soviet Union does not need to use NTM
to monitor most United States weapon systems because most American policy decisions
about weapon development and deployment are not kept secretly, and are more or less a
matter of public record. Id at 14-15.
77. ABM Treaty, supra note 3, art. XII; SALT I Treaty, supra note 4, art. V.
78. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 102 (1987) ("A rule of international law is
one that has been accepted as such by the international community of states: a) in the form
of customary law; b) by international agreement; or c) by derivation from general principals
common to the major legal systems of the world."); see Statute of the International Court
of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, art. 38(1). While official statements are absent, the Soviet
rejection of OSI may be the result of unwillingness to compromise their sovereignty (not
to mention sensitive military information) by allowing American representatives on Soviet
territory. While having backed OSI historically, the United States has become reluctant to
endorse OSI, ostensibly due to concerns that Soviet representatives might exploit OSI to
compromise American security interests. See 1. NEWHOUSE, supra note 65, at 14.
79. American acceptance of verifying ABM and SALT I treaty obligations by NTM was
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Before SALT I institutionalized NTM as international precedent,8° a
large debate occurred over whether NTM violated international law. In
1956, the Soviet Union asserted that the subjects of space-based intelligence collection were secrets guarded by a sovereign state.81 Intrusion
into such matters by NTM was an encroachment into matters guarded by
a sovereign state and, therefore, was a violation of that state's sovereign
space
prerogative. 82 As late as 1966, the Soviet Union believed American
83
reconnaissance programs inherently violated international law.
C. SALT II and Reliance on NTM

The textual provisions of SALT II dealing with verificationM were
identical to those of the SALT I Treaty.ss The strategic weapon system
limitations under SALT II, however, were more sophisticated and were
more difficult to verify by NTM. 6 SALT II included an extensive Protomade possible by the adoption of "adequate verification" as a standard. Adequate
verification means the "[a]bility to detect violations of military significance not by an
absolute (and unrealistic) requirement to detect any hypothetical violation however slight."
Matte, supra note 8, at 247; see supra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
80. W. RowELL, supra note 19, at 4. At a minimum, SALT I constituted Soviet
acknowledgment that satellites and similar NTM would be used to monitor and verify the
agreement. Cohen, The Evolution of Soviet View on SALT Verification: Implications for the
Future, in VERFICATION AND SALT, supra note 10, at 49, 54.
81.

Cohen, supra note 80, at 56.

82. Id at 57.
83. Id A Soviet legal expert in 1966 stated that "[i]f reconnaissance data are collected
with the help of a satellite, espionage does not cease to be espionage and responsibility
does not diminish at all because of the fact that outer space is used for espionage." Id.
In addition, the Soviets to this day argue that continued use of SR-71 (the United States'
replacement for the U-2) high-altitude reconnaissance flights are espionage operations. Id
at 55.
84. SALT II Treaty, supra note 5, art. XV.
85. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
86. Two such systems were multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles
("MIRV"s) and "heavy" Soviet ICBMs. Their technological sophistication complicated
verification issues. Because multiple nuclear warheads are encased in an ICBM's nose cone,
no NTM can verify MIRV limitations without additional measures. For example, SALT II
requires ICBM silos and SLBM submarines which carry missiles with MIRVs to be distinguishable from those not MIRV-capable "on the basis of externally observable design
features ...." Agreed Statements and Common Understandings Regarding the SALT II
Treaty (to art. II, para. 5), reprinted in 18 l.L.M. 1138, 1142 (1979) [hereinafter Agreed
Statements to the SALT II Treaty] and in S. TALB3OTr, supra note 5, at 292-93. These
features became known as functional related observable differences ("FROD"). FROD were
also used to bring heavy strategic bombers, not covered in SALT I, within the scope of
SALT II. Agreed Statements to the SALT II Treaty (to art. II, para. 3), reprinted in 18
I.L.M. at 1140 and in S. TALBoTr, supra, at 290-91. When a bomber has several different
capabilities (e.g., the Soviet "Backfire bomber," which is classified as an intermediate-range
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col87 and an Agreed Statements and Common Understandings. 88 In large
part, these documents were designed to clarify many difficult verification
issues.8 9
Another significant departure from SALT I was SALT II's Memorandum of Understanding9O between the United States and the Soviet Union,
which created a data base or inventory of the actual number of weapons
in each nation's strategic arsenal to be counted under SALT II. SALT
I contained no figures establishing the actual numbers of American or
Soviet weapons. 9' Tremendous congressional pressure was exerted in the
United States to demand a data base from the Soviets which would allow
the United States to confirm the effectiveness of NTM efforts. 92 Because
in peacetime the United States political system forbids secret weapons
development, and because the Soviets have access to a free flow of public
information about United States weapons programs, the Soviet Union
does not need to rely on their NTM to gain a comprehensive knowledge
of American strategic capabilities. 93 The ease with which information can
be gathered on American defense policy starkly contrasts with Soviet
policy; Soviet SALT II negotiators are kept in the dark about details
concerning their own strategic weapons. 94 Moreover, the chief Soviet
negotiator to SALT II, Vladimir Semenov, did not disagree with the
objective fact that the Soviets rely less on NTM than the United States. 9
Eventually the Soviets conceded on this issue and prepared an inventory
weapon under SALT II, yet also has an intercontinental capability) it is impossible to distinguish performance capabilities (range, payload, speed, all of which have military significance)
by national technical means without provisions found in the Agreed Statements to the
SALT II Treaty. Id
87. Protocol to the SALT II Treaty, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1159 (1979) and in S.
TALBOTr, supra note 5, at 288-89.
88. See supra note 86.

89. Id
90. Memorandum of Understanding to the SALT II Treaty Regarding the Establishment
of a Data Base on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1161
(1979) and in S. TALBOTr, supra note 5, at 307; Statement of Data on the Numbers of
Strategic Offensive Arms to the SALT 11Treaty, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1161 (1979) and in
S. TALBOTr, supra note 5, at 308-09.
91. S. TALRBTr, supra note 5, at 23.
92. Id at 95-96.
93. M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 137; Cohen, supra note 80, at 54. In the United
States, publications relating to defense policy and arms control are "voluminous," while
detailed discussions of verification issues [in the Soviet Union] are virtually non-existent.
Id
94. Soviet negotiators became nervous when their American counterparts discussed facts
and figures which the Soviets themselves were not cleared to know. S. TALBOTr, supra note
5, at 99.
95. Id. at 91-92.
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of their weapons covered under the treaty.9 This was a breakthrough,
97
albeit limited, in overcoming Soviet secretiveness and distrust.
SALT II's reliance on NTM as a standard for arms control verification demonstrates both its advantages and limitations. On the positive
side, NTM gave both the United States and the Soviet Union the
opportunity to sidestep the past pitfalls of OSI verification. 98 Technological advances in weaponry, however, which have made NTM increasingly
unreliable, necessitated further agreement concerning both policy and
verification understandings by both nations, outside the text of the treaty.
While NTM remained the verification standard of American/Soviet arms
control agreements, subsequent events led to a change in American arms
control policy, culminating in the adoption of OSI verification in the INF
Treaty.
IV. INF ON-SITE VERIFICATION: A
CONTRAST TO NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS
A. The Abandonment of Strict Reliance on NTM

Several factors led to the movement away from NTM and the United
States' reliance on OSI as an integral part of INF verification. First, the
record of alleged Soviet violations of the ABM, SALT I, and SALT II
treaties prompted a re-examination of their viability. Although SALT II
was withdrawn from Senate consideration, both the United States and the
Soviet Union officially complied with the treaty's terms until it expired
in 1985. Senator Steven Symms referred to seven reports issued by
President Reagan to Congress on Soviet SALT cheating.
These
statements revealed that the Soviets had violated SALT and other arms
control accords on at least fifty occasions. 99 In the last of these reports,
96. Id. at 96-97.
97. Id.; M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 140-41. According to Semenov, the exchange of
American and Soviet data bases "repealed four-hundred years of Russian history" of military
secrecy. Id. at 140.
98. Graybeal, supra note 53, at 23.
99. SEN. COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, NATO DEFENSE AND THE INF TREATY, S. REP. No.
312, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1988) [hereinafter NATO DEFENSE REP.]. Many commentators argued that the Soviets had violated article V of the SALT I Interim Agreement,
prohibiting the interference of NTM monitoring, through a "massive and increased level of
deliberate concealment of the testing and operations of their strategic offensive forces."
Humphrey, Analysis and Compliance Enforcement in SALT Verification, in VERIFICAION AND
SALT, supra note 10, at 111, 115. Specifically, it was alleged that the Soviets had impeded
American NTM by: 1) encrypting telemetry on missile tests (telemetry was a prime source
of information relevant to treaty limitations on missile size and range); 2) camouflaging and
concealing ICBM testing, production, and deployment; and 3) concealing submarine
construction. Id. In addition, it was alleged that the Soviet Union had violated the ABM
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President Reagan stated, "Compliance with treaty obligations is a cornerstone of international law."'t Those who agreed with the President and
Senator Symms asserted that this record of Soviet cheating could only be
addressed in the INF treaty by OSI verification. As early as 1981,
President Reagan stated that the United States would not limit arms
control proposals to those verifiable by NTM, but would explore cooperative measures, such as OSI.10 t President Reagan's determination to seek
OSI verification was based on OSI's ability both to increase confidence
in compliance and to deter violations by increasing the risk of detection
and its quick and unambiguous detection of violations.'02
The second development that prompted American departure from
reliance on NTM for arms control verification was a growing concern
about potential arms control violations that could have a "significant
impact" on the American/Soviet strategic balance. This development was
1°3
the SS-20, the first mobile Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missile.
While ICBM silos and SLBM submarines can be detected easily by satellite technology, NTM verification of mobile missiles that are smaller and
capable of more flexible deployment is more difficult.1°4 Mobile missiles

raise concerns of potential Soviet concealment of illegal missiles in
"barns, warehouses, and forests."' 05 Most importantly, mobile missiles
create doubt about whether the United States knows exactly how many
declared missiles are in existence. An example of the current uncertainty regarding such information is that the Department of Defense
estimated 441 deployed SS-20s, with one "reload" missile for each
Treaty by: 1) "extensive testfing]" of air defense missiles and radars in an ABM mode; 2)
deploying possible new ABM radars; 3) developing rapidly deployable, possibly mobile ABM
systems; 4) camouflaging ABM research and development; and 5) falsifying officially the
number of test range ABM launchers which were dismantled in 1972; all of these actions
being prohibited under the ABM Treaty. Id at 114. Soviet General of the Army, V.
Tolubko, a deputy minister of defense and chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, has stated
however, that the Soviet Union has "[niever violated obligations which it has assumed" and
"[i]t
will not violate its obligation[s] in such a most important political issue as [SALT I].
We are strictly adhering to the signed documents." Cohen, supra note 79, at 49.
100. Report by President Reagan, Seventh Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance
with Arms Control Agreements (Dec. 1, 1987) (minority views of Senator Steven D. Symms,
R-Idaho), quoted in NATO DEFENSE REP., supra note 99, at 91.
101. M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 136.
102. Graybeal & Krepon, supra note 53, at 24.
103. See S. TALBOTr, DEADLY GAmBrrs, 28-29 (1984). The SS-20 was the first Soviet
missile with reliable solid-fuel propulsion. Id.
104. W. RowELL, supra note 19, at 5; see also Scoville, The Application of Verification
Tools to Control of Offensive Strategic Missiles, in ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION, supra note
48, at 199, 200-02.
105. Davis, Land-Mobile ICBMs: Verification and Breakout, in VERiFICATION AND SALT,
supra note 10, at 143, 144.
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launcher. The assumption regarding the "reload" capability is based on
American estimates of possible SS-20 production and the size of garages
for SS-20 launchers which are capable of storing extra missiles. 106 It also
has been determined that the United States NTM would not be as highly
effective against ground launched cruise missiles ("GLCM"s) or MIRVs
and that an illegal force of GLCMs could not be detected with a
necessary degree of confidence." 7 Given the potential problem that
NTM cannot verify a treaty covering mobile missiles,' 0 S I was seen as
a possible solution. 109
Furthermore, there are operational limits on NTM effectiveness.110
For example, a satellite cannot take visual photographs at night. Also,
the superpowers have only a few operational spacecraft in space at once,
they do not have twenty-four hour coverage of each other's territory, and
they can only photograph part of a target area at once.'
The most
recent example of NTM vulnerability was the Challenger disaster, which
crippled American satellite capability."2
The third consideration which led the move away from reliance on
NTM was the scope of the INF Treaty itself. Specifically, the treaty
provided for the elimination of missile systems, as opposed to mere
reductions. While missile reduction may only be verified through NTM,
the absolute certainty necessary for a total ban of given weapons requires
OSI measures.1 3 A treaty requiring reductions leaves each side with a
mutually agreed number of weapons. As this number decreases, each
side's ability to alter the strategic balance through cheating increases.
This makes the need for certainty regarding compliance proportionately
higher. Upon total elimination of a class of weapons, as is required by
106. B. BERKOWlTZ, supra note 51, at 75.
107. SEN. INTELUGENCE REP., supra note 7, at 7; M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 134.
108. Spy satellites are in polar orbit, circling while the earth rotates below, observing
"slices" of the planet. B. BERKOWrFZ, supra note 51, at 74. If a satellite's intelligence
capabilities are interfered with by darkness or clouds while passing over important territory,
it is possible that days, weeks, or even a month could go by before the satellite could
observe key missile installations. Id This gives mobile missiles the opportunity to move
undetected by beating the "information cycle" of the satellite. Needless to say, this
possibility increases the potential for cheating under a treaty which verifies mobile missiles
with NTM, as opposed to OSI. See Davis, supra note 105, at 144.
109. M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 136.
110. Id at 133.
111. Id.
112. Inman, The Military Perspective, in INTELLIGENCE AND ARMS CONTROL, supra note
61, at 50. The space shuttle is designed to launch and maintain the very satellites the
United States depends upon for its NTM capabilities.
113. The technology of monitoring compliance can determine the scope of the actual
agreements. M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 133. With systems that, according to some,
cannot be verified by NTM, verification standards must change to meet a treaty's needs.
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the LNF Treaty, a nation needs the highest possible degree of confidence
that another treaty party is not cheating and thus gaining an opportunity
to alter the strategic balance.
B. The INF Treaty and On-Site Verification: Specific Provisions

The INF Treaty is the "most comprehensive and intrusive verification
regimen ever established to monitor compliance with an [American-]
Soviet arms control agreement."" 4 The OSI provisions go well beyond
mere confidence building and security measures."' This "intrusiveness"
is clear from the first clause of the verification section: "For the purpose
of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty,
6
each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections.""

0S I is to

be implemented in the following manner:
1. A baseline inventory of weapons, will be compiled by each
party by OSI solely for the purpose of "verify[ing] the
number of missiles, launchers, support structures and
support equipment and other data

....

117

2. "Each Party shall have the Tight to conduct inspections to
verify the elimination ...

of missile operating bases and

missile support facilities .... ,,1
3. "[Elach Party shall conduct inspections of the process of
elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range
missiles . . . and shorter range missiles and launchers of

such missiles and support equipment associated with such
missiles . .

.,,9

4. "[E]ach Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry
into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring of [current missile production facilities.]" 20
114. Summary and Text of the INF Treaty and Protocols, ARMs CONTROL TODAY, Jan.Feb. 1988, at 15.
115. Graybeal & Krepon, supra note 53, at 24.
116. INF Treaty, supra note 2, art. XI, para. 1 (emphasis added).
117. Id. para. 3.
118. Id. para. 4.
119. Id. para. 7.
120. Id. para. 6. Each party has the right to station, 24 hours a day, up to 30 resident
inspectors to monitor the portals of missile production facilities to verify the cessation of
production of missiles covered under the treaty. Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating
to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of
America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, art.
VI, paras. 14-15, reprintedin 27 I.L.M. 190 (1988) [hereinafter INF Protocol] and in PUB.
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5. "Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections
. .. for 13 years ... of former missile operating bases and
former missile support facilities.., but not former missile
production facilities."12
Foreign delegations have the right to routine inspections 122 of
production, missile storage, deployment and missile elimination areas,w
and to challenge inspections' 24 at certain suspect sites that raise compliance concerns. 5 The purposes for inspecting each nation's military
facilities are not only to conduct inventory, but also to confirm compliance with treaty obligations to remove or destroy specific weapon
systems as well. Inspections may be cancelled only if a state of force
majeure exists.?26 Furthermore, because most of the missiles are-located
in nations other than the United States and the Soviet Union, 27 the INF
Treaty provides for inspection of sites that are located in other coun28

tries.1

Also included in the INF Treaty is a Protocol establishing the
procedures for the elimination of the missiles within the treaty's scope.129
No. 9555, supra note 2, at 52.
121. INF Treaty, supra note 2, art. XI, para. 5.
122. Routine inspections are expressly permitted under the agreement and do not imply
suspicion of violation. Routine inspections are the least intrusive form of OSI, consisting
of the right to visit a specified site at a specified time. Graybeal & Krepon, supra note 53,
at 22. Routine inspections "modestly increase confidence in compliance without compromising intelligence method[s] and sources." Id at 26.
123. Id. at 24.
124. Id at 22-23. Challenge inspections do not require evidence supporting a potential
violation. They involve the right to inspect a specified site where cheating might occur, at
unspecified times. Id. at 22. Challenge inspections are not likely to build confidence in
compliance or deter violations because a determined cheater can avoid a thorough or timely
inspection. Id.
125. Id
126. INF Protocol, supra note 120, art. X. The Reagan administration defined force
majeure, according to international law, as a "'superior or irresistible force' outside the
control of the Parties that could not be avoided by the exercise of due care." NATO
DEFENSE REP., supra note 99, at 26.
127. These nations include the Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom, Italy,
and Belgium. See INF Treaty Data Update, June 1, 1988, at 1-64. This document contains
the official data exchanged between the United States and the Soviet Union regarding all
specifications (such as location, size, capabilities, and weapon inventories) of weapons
systems covered under the treaty.
128. INF Treaty, supra note 2, art. XI, para. 2. All sites subject to inspection are
covered in the INF Treaty's Memorandum of Understanding. See Memorandum of
Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the INF Treaty, reprinted
in 27 l.L.M. 98 (1988) and in PUB. No. 9555, supra note 2, at 9-11.
129. Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of Missiles Subject to the INF
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The INF Protocol Governing Elimination specifies what parts of each
to be destroyed' 30 and the particular methods to destroy the
missile are
1 31
missiles.
The treaty also provides for verification by NTM3 2 and prohibition
of interference with such efforts. 33 This provision maximizes the effectiveness of the OSI rights in the treaty because OSI is extremely
useful when complementing NTM capabilities.T M The protection of NTM
capabilities also is important because of the ban on flight testing of all
missiles covered under the treaty. 3
Finally, the INF Treaty has an escape clause. t 36 Each party may
withdraw from the treaty "if [a party] decides that extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests." 137 Ostensibly, this clause secures each party's right to withdraw
in the event of cheating by the other side. Treaty abrogation, however,
is only one alternative in the event of a breach. One commentator
argues that such a move may not be the best course of action.3
Evidence of a treaty breach, while convincing to government officials,
might be ambiguous to the public, thereby undermining crucial support
for subsequent government action.39 Second, notwithstanding another
party's cheating, that cheating party's military actions might still be more
restrained under the treaty than if the treaty was abrogated. 1 A nation
might also not want to withdraw from the treaty because of the requireTreaty, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 183 (1988) and in PUB. 9555, supra note 2, at 43 [hereinafter
INF Protocol Governing Elimination].
130. INF Protocol Governing Elimination, supra note 129, art. I.

131. Id art. II.
132. INF Treaty, supra note 2, art. XII, para. 1 ("For the purpose of ensuring
verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national
technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law.").
133. Id art. XII, para. 2 ("Neither Party shall: (a) interfere with national technical
means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this
Article, or (b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.").
134. Graybeal & Krepon, supra note 53, at 24.
135. INF Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI, para. 1.
136. Id. art. XV, para 2.
137. Id. If either party exercises this right, it must give the other party six-months notice
prior to withdrawal, and must provide the other party with a statement of the extraordinary
events that the withdrawing party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. Id
138. M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 142-43.
139. Id at 142.
140. Id
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ment that a country taking this course of action must produce a statement explaining the reasons for its withdrawal. Such a statement might
compromise intelligence sources and capabilities if it disclosed a party's
specific breaches 41
A party's course of action depends on its attitude toward verification
and the importance a party places on evidence of non-compliance. For
example, if a party adheres to the legalistic approach to arms control
(i.e., advocates effective and/or absolute verification), 142 a party might
consider treaty withdrawal regardless of the magnitude or significance of
existing violations. Conversely, if a non-breaching party does not equate
noncompliance with justification for treaty abrogation because of a belief
that "[niot all violations are deliberate decisions of the government to
cheat,"'14 3 the non-breaching party's decision to withdraw would depend
on whether the treaty might still serve their interests, notwithstanding the
cheating. 144
The INF Treaty does not contain any provisions dealing with action
to be taken in the event of a breach. 4 The absence of such terms,
however, does not mean that a party would not face serious consequences if it violated the treaty's terms. "[A] very powerful sanction exists
which induces compliance with bilateral [nuclear arms control] agreements, and which propels the Parties towards continuing their [nuclear
arms control] negotiations."'1 This is the "ultimate consequences sanction,' 1 47 or, in other words, "the negative consequences that would flow

141. Id

142. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
143. Inman, supra note 112, at 52.
144. A clear contrast between the two positions described above can be seen in the
approach of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations, on the one hand, and the Reagan
administration on the other. Nixon, Ford, and Carter did not equate noncompliance with
cheating. They advocated a substantive approach to verification, and saw compliance
questions resulting from ambiguous monitoring data as important issues, but not ones which
constituted grounds for treaty abrogation, unless the Soviets could alter the strategic balance
by means of undetectable cheating. This attitude reflected the "adequate" verification
standard. See supra notes 24-38 and accompanying text. In contrast, the Reagan administration supported the legalistic approach to arms control, which assumed that ambiguous
monitoring data was evidence of another party's guilt. All violations were crucial, even if
insignificant militarily. M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 143.
145. Most American legal processes and values do not apply directly to the international
arena. Most of the time, the only enforcement mechanisms available are the parties
themselves. See W. RowELL,supra note 19, at 33.
146.

J. DAHLrrz, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL WITH EFFECTIE INTERNATtONAL AGREEMENTS

191 (1985).
147. Id (emphasis in original).
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to both Parties if they failed to reach substantive agreement." 14 The key
feature of the "ultimate consequences sanction" is that each interim
failure to reach an agreement makes the next failure more likely, and if
subsequent failures are not checked, one nation would ultimately "invoke the sanction of nuclear war." 149 With each setback of the bilateral
nuclear arms control process, "the threat of the sanction becomes more
acute." 150 Another commentator expressed this concept in terms of diplomatic or political momentum. 511 While the threat of treaty abrogation
deters cheating, "[plolitical inertia [sic] or momentum- the desire to
keep things going-and the unusability [sic] of evidence are two strong2
factors that may inhibit abrogation in response to a treaty violation."1515 3
Political inertia is the natural spin-off of the long negotiation process.
An example of the effect of political inertia is found in the American
response to the Soviet resumption of atmospheric nuclear testing in 1961
(following a bilateral moratorium on such testing). Inertia resulting from
nontesting produced a protracted debate in the United States on
resuming atmospheric
testing and delayed resumption of American testing
54
for several months.
In the context of past American/Soviet bilateral arms control efforts,
the precedential value of the INF Treaty is clear. The treaty goes far
beyond verification techniques that the Soviet Union has agreed to in
earlier
treaties such as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,' 5 SALT 1,' 6 SALT
57
111 - all of which rely on NTM verification. In no other treaty has each
nation relinquished so much control over their military forces.
The INF Treaty and OSI are a critical precedent in the development
of arms control verification provisions, containing both important
advantages and limitations that bear directly not only upon the treaty's
significance as precedent in the context of past arms control verification,
but also upon a future strategic arms reduction treaty.

148. Id
149. Id
150. Id
151. Katz, supra note 10, at 196.
152. Id
153. Id
154. Id at 197.
155. Aug. 5, 1963, United States-Soviet Union, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.IAS. No. 5433 (1963).
The treaty prohibits atmospheric or underwater nuclear testing and relies on NTM for
verification. Id. art. I.
156. See supra note 4.
157. See supra note 5.
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V. THE INF TREATY'S IMPACT ON A FUTURE STRATEGIC ARMS
REDUCTION TREATY
The INF Treaty, while a profound arms control precedent, is part of
a larger process which, hopefully, will culminate in the conclusion of an
American/Soviet treaty reducing the superpowers' strategic nuclear
arsenals.5 8 It is important to understand how the INF Treaty and OSI
affect the prospects of a successful strategic arms accord.
First, INF verification has changed Soviet attitudes regarding OSI in
a positive way because "[o~ld barriers to more intensive cooperative
verification techniques are falling." 1 9 The principle of OSI clearly has
been accepted by the Soviet Union. 60 Some commentators attribute this
change to technological developments (i.e., mobile missiles such as
GLCMs), and the total ban on treaty weapons, both of which suggest the
need for OSI.161 Also, Soviet policies of glasnost and perestroika have
remarkably diminished traditional Soviet secretiveness. 162 Overcoming
Soviet hostility towards OSI is critical because a future strategic arms
reduction treaty (e.g. "START" treaty) may need more intrusive verification measures than those provided under the INF Treaty. More importantly, the INF Treaty and OSI will give the United States and the
Soviet Union valuable experience in addressing OSI problems to be faced
in the START treaty. 163
Notwithstanding the unparalleled breakthrough that the INF Treaty
represents, limitations exist on the treaty's provisions which narrow its
precedential effect on a potential START treaty. The challenge and
158. After a seven-month recess, negotiations for a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
("START") between the United States and the Soviet Union resumed on June 19, 1989.
Geneva Talks Resume, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1989, at A6, col. 3. Since the resumption of
the START talks, United States Secretary of State Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze affirmed their desire to include on-site inspections of missile production
facilities in any strategic weapons treaty. Friedman, US.-Soviet Talks End with Progress on
Arns Control, id., Sept. 24, 1989, § 1, at 1, col. 6. At the December 1989 Malta summit
between President Bush and Secretary Gorbachev, both leaders expressed hope that a
START treaty could be concluded at the proposed June 1990 summit in Washington, D.C.
Gordon, Bush Gives Gorbachev Economic and Arms Proposals, id, Dec. 3, 1989, § 1, at 1,
col. 6. Before Malta, however, a Bush administration official stated that a START treaty
would be difficult to reach in 1990, due to several problems, including verification issues,
such as the American proposal to monitor Soviet SS-24 ICBM factories. Gordon, Prospects
for Pact on Long-Range Arms Next Year Called Difficult, id, Nov. 8, 1989, at All, col. 1.

159. Connolly, Does the Constitution Limit On-Site Inspection?, ARMS
June 1988, at 8, 8.

160. M.

SHEEHAN,

supra note 10, at 140.

161. Connolly, supra note 159, at 9-10.
162. Id
163. Id at 8.
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surprise inspections provided for in the INF Treaty will be neither a
surprise nor particularly challenging. 164 Even though the facilities specified in the treaty's Memorandum of Understanding will be closely monitored, verification of the rest of American and Soviet arms manufac16
turing, research, development, and transportation will not improve.
This result most likely will be due to the tension between arms control
verification and national security.' 66 The concern exists that the Soviets
might exploit more intrusive OSI for purposes of espionage, which
outweighs the need for more direct and more intrusive OSI. 67
The lack of inspection rights at sites not specified within the treaty's
Memorandum of Understanding makes Soviet cheating in non-obvious,
unanticipated locations more likely."6 Therefore, the "burden of detecting banned activities at undeclared sites," falls squarely on NTM. 69
NTM backup can detect testing, production, or deployment of any missile
banned under the treaty, 70 before such cheating results in any shift in
the strategic balance. Furthermore, any SS-20 not flight-tested, which is
hidden in violation of the treaty would have no military utility.' 7' This
is not the case in a potential START treaty. The monitoring of numerical limits or reductions on strategic systems to be covered under a
prospective START treaty is much more difficult than a total ban on
specified weapons systems as is the case with the INF Treaty. ' 7 Even
minimal Soviet cheating under a START treaty, which is projected to cut
deep into strategic arsenals, might produce significant disparities in the
strategic balance. 73 Former President Nixon wrote that the INF provisions might allow Soviet cheating which, in the context of intermediate
nuclear forces, might result in an "important" but not "cataclysmic"
impact on the superpower strategic balance. 174 In the context of a
START agreement, Soviet cheating resulting from "slack" OSI verification might place the West's survivability at risk. 175
Notwithstanding the above discussion, embracing OSI as a panacea
164. See NATO DEFENSE REP, supra note 99, at 28.
165. Id
166.

167.
168.
169.
170.

SEN. INTELLIGENCE REP., supra note 7, at 4.
Id; R. SCRIBNER, supra note 10, at 30-31.
Connolly, supra note 159, at 8-9.
SEN. INTELUGENCE REP., supra note 7, at 7.
Id at 6.

171. Id at 7.
172. See id at 8.
173. Connolly, supra note 159, at 9.
174. Letter from Former President Richard Nixon to Senator Sam Nunn and Senator
John Warner, Feb. 11, 1988, reprinted in NATO DEFENSE REP., supra note 99, at 134-35.
175. Id
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for all difficult verification issues poses some danger. 176 OSI is not the
ultimate means of verifying arms control treaties with the Soviet Union.'"
78
OSI may be used more effectively in concert with NTM capabilities.
must
A chief advantage of OSI is that cheating at clandestine locations
179 OSI
involve greater economic and political costs and technical risks.
will reduce the Soviet Union's military return on its clandestine activities.'8 Therefore, even routine inspections, the military utility of
which may be limited,'8 ' and politically oversold,8 2 may be useful START
treaty provisions.' 3 In addition, OSI may be used as a strong deterrent
against potential cheating.'8 OSI rights in a START treaty would be a
"[plowerful symbol of the improved cooperation needed if new arms
control agreements are to succeed." s5 In the final analysis, no verification plan can ensure strict compliance when a state deliberately chooses
to deviate from its agreement.18' Strict compliance is founded best in a
mutual desire to reap the benefits of an agreement.'87
These issues demonstrate that if OSI provisions are included in a
future START agreement, they must allow for intrusive measures
regarding the sites subject to inspection and the timing of inspections.
176. R. SCRIBNER, supra note 10, at 29-30; M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 136. In
addition, the execution of the on-site searches may not proceed as smoothly as one might
have hoped. For example, in March 1990 there was a confrontation between American
operators of an x-ray inspection device stationed outside a Soviet missile plant and Soviet
officials. The x-ray machine is used to make sure that canisters for larger Soviet missiles
produced at the plant were not being used to hide the smaller SS-20 missiles, in violation
of the INF Treaty. A standoff developed when Soviet officials prevented the x-ray machine
from being turned on to check a missile being transported from the factory. Smith, Missile
Inspection Technicality Provokes Top.Level Protest to Soviets, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1990, at
A17, col. 1. One account of the incident states that pistols were drawn by Soviet officials
against unarmed United States personnel. Evans & Novak, Missile Crisis, id., Mar. 16, 1990,
at A23, col. 2. Finally, the missile was "rammed through" the x-ray machine while it was
not turned on. Id
177. R. SciuBNPR, supra note 10, at 17.
178. Graybeal & Krepon, supra note 53, at 24; see M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 136.
179. Graybeal & Krepon, supra note 53, at 24.
180. Id
181. M. SHEEHAN, supra note 10, at 136. OSI inspectors most likely would not find
evidence of any cheating because any suspicious situations would have been removed before
inspection. Id
182. Graybeal & Krepon, supra note 53, at 26. Because the United States is not
experienced or familiar with OSI, we should not depend on it. Id
183. Id at 24.
184. R. SCRIBNER, supra note 10, at 30.
185. Graybeal & Krepon, supra note 53, at 26.
186. Id at 24.
187. Id at 26.
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The INF Treaty's OSI provisions may indeed become the "baseline" for
START.l ss Absent these provisions, there could be dire consequences for
the current strategic stability between the United States and the Soviet
Union. 189 While the degree of intrusion allowed under the INF Treaty's
OSI provisions may be insufficient for purposes of START verification,
these provisions include inspection of factories and the determination of
baseline inventories, two concepts necessary to verify limits on or
reductions of ICBMs and SLBMs under START.
VI.

MAXIMUM OSI AND START: CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS

Any suggestion that START OSI verification must include highly
intrusive or maximum OSI raises another issue, namely, whether the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution will be violated by
giving the Soviets inspection rights over private, commercial property
owned by American defense contractors.J90 In the landmark case, Reid
v. Covert,19' the Supreme Court held that a treaty between the United
States and a foreign nation may not violate the Constitution. t 91 Therefore, any START agreement with maximum OSI, vital to START verification, must pass constitutional muster.
Maximum OSI would involve surprise searches-held at sites not
specified beforehand -with little or no warning. Because most American
strategic weapon systems are built by private enterprises, maximum OSI
under START would require private production facilities to be subject to
warrantless searches by Soviet inspectors. 193 The fourth amendment
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
188. Id at 22. Indeed, United States and Soviet negotiators have agreed to an actual
on-site inspections of strategic weapons installations, including the Soviet SS-18 ICBM and
SSN-23 SLBM, and the United States MX ICBM and Trident II SLBM. Powers Agree on
Missile Inspection, Wash. Post, Jan. 1, 1990, at A21, col. 1.
189. Graybeal & Krepon, supra note 53, at 22. While the INF Treaty may not have a
large military impact on the strategic balance between the superpowers, any START treaty
will have a very large role in reshaping the American/Soviet military relationship. d
190. See generally Connolly, supra note 159.
191. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
192. Id. at 17-18.

193. See Connolly, supra note 159, at 9.
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to be seized. 1 4
Generally, the fourth amendment has been interpreted in the context of
police searches and law enforcement purposes. 1 The question at hand
has not been addressed directly by the federal courts, and is an issue
"wide open for debate." 1 6 One straightforward analysis, however, brings
OSI under the scope of the fourth amendment.
Article VI of the Constitution states that treaties made under "[tihe
197
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
19
The Supreme Court has affirmed this principle in Missouri v. Holland, 8
stating that "treaties made under the authority of the United States...
are declared the supreme law of the land. .

. ."99

Therefore, Soviet in-

spections of American private military contractors under a ratified
START treaty would be made pursuant to, and under the authority of,
United States law. The argument can be made that Soviet inspectors,
empowered under Federal law, constitute the very "sovereign authority"
upon which the fourth amendment was "intended as a restraint. . .. "200
This analysis is supported by Camara v. Municipal Court2o1 where the
Court held that fourth amendment protections applied to searches by
regulatory officials and were not restricted to situations involving criminal
behavior. 20
An American private military contractor, subject to Soviet inspection
might seek an order enjoining Soviet inspectors from demanding access
to production facilities. This situation would most frequently arise when
inspections might tend to expose a contractor's high technology, not
194. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
195. Connolly, supra note 159, at 10.
196. Id at 9.
197. U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2. ("This Constitution and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").

198. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
199. Id. at 432.
200. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). Burdeau established the principal
that the fourth amendment only protected citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures
resulting from government conduct. See C. WHrrEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 4.02 (2d ed. 1986).

201. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
202. Id. at 530 ("It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property
are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of
criminal behavior."); see also Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 254 (1959) (Brennan, J.
dissenting) (The distinction made between criminal and civil searches and one's right to
protection from warrantless searches "perverts the [Fourth] Amendment.").
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under the scope of a treaty, to Soviet "industrial espionage" conducted
under the guise of valid treaty inspections.
It has been argued that defense contractors may waive, or be
required to waive, their fourth amendment rights as a condition precedent to receiving government business.m While this is a possibility, this
discussion is concerned with the likelihood that private industry will not
waive such rights.
Assuming that the question of OSI's constitutionality under the
fourth amendment will be addressed by the courts, several decisions may
provide some guidance on this issue. 2 In Katz v. United States, m the
Court held that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
fourth amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and
6
In United States v. Biswell, the Court
well-delineated exceptions. '"20
recognized such an exception. 207 In that case, the Supreme Court upheld
a warrantless search of a firearms dealer authorized under the Gun
Control Act of 1968. 20 The Court determined that "[ilf inspection is to
be effective and serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even
frequent, inspections are essential. In this context, the prerequisite of a
warrant could easily frustrate Isuch an] inspection. . . ."M Inspections
needed to enforce compliance with the statute210 only posed "limited
threats" to a gun dealer's justifiable expectations 211 of privacy.212 When
a gun dealer chose to do business in a "pervasively regulated business,"
such a choice was made with the knowledge that the business would be
In Illinois v. Ktuli214 the Court
subject to effective inspection.213
203. Connolly, supra note 159, at 9.
204. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (rev'g 67 N.Y.2d 338, 493 N.E.2d
926 (1986)); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981);
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
see also Connolly, supra note 159, at 9.
205. 389 U.S. at 347.
206. Id. at 357 (footnotes omitted).
207. 406 U.S. at 311.
208. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-30 (1988).
209. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316.
210. Statutorily authorized searches were allowed only during business hours. Id. at 313;
18 U.S.C. §§ 921-30 (1988).
211. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 ("[The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.").
212. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 316.
213. Id.; see Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978) ("Certain industries have
such a history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of privacy ...could

exist for a proprietor over the stock of such an enterprise."); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 351'2.
214. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
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acknowledged that "an inspection program may be a necessary component of regulation in certain industries, and . .. that unannounced,

inspections may be necessary" for effective law enforcewarrantless
215
ment.
It is critical to understand that the exemption for heavily regulated
industries from the fourth amendment's prohibition against warrantless
searches is based on the Court's recognition of broad congressional
authority "to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches and seizures. '216 Thus, in Donovan v. Dewey,217 the Court held provisions of a
federal mine safety act 218 granting mine inspectors "a right of entry to,
upon, or through any coal or other mine" with "no advance notice of an
21 9
inspection," did not violate the mine owner's fourth amendment rights.
While "[tihe Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches applies to administrative inspections of private commercial
property," 220 legislative schemes "authorizing warrantless searches of
commercial property do not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment." 221 The standard set forth requires a congressional determination
that "warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme"
and that "the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive
and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be
aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken
for specific purposes." 22
Warrantless searches are "necessary" when a warrant requirement
might "significantly frustrate effective enforcement of the Act." 2 3 A
regulation is "sufficiently comprehensive and defined" when the "scope
and frequency" of administrative inspections is tailored to the concerns
regulated by the statute.224 If so, "[tihe certainty and regularity of its
application, provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant."225
The Court recently reaffirmed the principles regarding application of
215. Id. at 357 (citations omitted).
216. Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (citations
omitted). Colonnade upheld federal agents' warrantless search (authorized by 26 U.S.C. §
5146(b)) which led to seizure of illegally refilled alcohol containers. Id. at 73.
217. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
218. Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 813 (a) (1988).
219. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 596.
220. Id at 598 (citations omitted).
221. Id
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id at 600.
Id at 603.
Id at 601.
Id at 603.
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the fourth amendment to heavily regulated industries in New York v.
Burger.226 In Burger, the Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals
decision, holding that criminal evidence gathered during a search of
commercial premises, authorized by statute as a matter of administration,
should be suppressed. 227 The Court stated that an owner of commercial
property has an expectation of privacy which is protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by the fourth amendment.m This
expectation, however, is "particularly attenuated" when commercial
property is "employed in 'closely regulated' industries." 2" An owner of
commercial property in an industry which has had a "history of government oversight" has no reasonable expectation of privacy from unreasonable searches and seizures. 0 The Court provides a three-part test
similar to that in Donovan. First, there must be a "'substantial' government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the
inspection is made." 2 1 Second, the "warrantless inspections must be
necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme. ' ' 232 Third, the "certainty and
regularity" of the statute's inspection program must provide a "constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant."'
In effect, maximum OSI, to be effective, would give Soviet inspectors
the right to conduct surprise inspections of American defense contractors' properties.3 To require Soviet inspectors to obtain a warrant to
inspect such facilities would defeat the element of surprise and "significantly frustrate" the Soviets' rights under a maximum OSI provision
included in a START agreement. In addition, details included in the
INF Treaty's Protocol on Elimination235 and Protocol on Inspections23
demonstrate that the inspection rights of Soviet inspectors would be
"sufficiently tailored" to meet the requirements set forth in Burger, Krull,
Donovan, and Biswell. These cases indicate that the maximum OSI
provisions necessary under START verification would not violate defense
contractors' fourth amendment rights.
A maximum OSI scheme most likely would satisfy the three part
Burger test. First, it is difficult to find an industry more heavily regu226.
227.
228.
229.

482 U.S. 691 (1987).
Id at 716.
Id at 700.
Id

230. Id
231. Id at 702 (citing Donovan, 452 U.S. at 602).
232. Id. (citing Donovan, 452 U.S. at 600).
233. Id at 703 (citing Donovan, 452 U.S. at 603).
234. See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text.
235. For a discussion of this protocol, see supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text.

236. For a discussion of this protocol, see supra notes 120-126 and accompanying text.
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lated than the defense establishment or a more important government
interest in promulgating a verification plan forming the basis of a
START treaty. Second, a warrant requirement for surprise OSI would
defeat the material benefit of the inspection. Third, the stationing of
constant monitoring staffs around missile production facilities (as permitted under the INF Treaty's OSI provisions), not to mention the right
to inspect such facilities itself, would be a constant reminder of the
potential for periodic inspections. Furthermore, as discussed above, the
INF Protocols on Elimination and Inspection are clear evidence that
Soviet inspection rights can be tailored narrowly to fit the United States'
needs.
Burger, Krull, Donovan, and Biswell indicate that maximum OSI
provisions included in a prospective START accord would not violate
defense contractors' fourth amendment rights to have their commercial
property free from unreasonable searches and seizures by Soviet
inspectors acting under the authority of federal law.
VII. CONCLUSION

Supporters and critics alike have accepted that the INF Treaty is a
great step toward more effective arms control because it affords treaty
signatories a greater opportunity to police each party's compliance with
the treaty's legal obligations. The INF Treaty not only sets precedent
with respect to past arms control verification standards, but also paves
the way, in principle, for OSI verification to become part of a START
accord aimed at reducing American and Soviet strategic arms. Nevertheless, the INF Treaty's limitations also indicate that the United States and
the Soviet Union must adopt more comprehensive OSI provisions to
achieve adequate or effective verification. Finally, while there has been
no opportunity to test any potential constitutional challenges to an
intrusive OSI plan, recent case law indicates that such measures would
be deemed permissible.
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